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CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS WITH INCOME 
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Cash transfer programs induce multiplier effects when recipients put the money 
they receive to work to generate additional income. The ultimate income effects are 
multiples of the amounts transferred. This paper analyzes the PROCAMPO program in 
Mexico, which was introduced to compensate farmers for the anticipated negative effect 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the price of basic crops. The 
transfer rules and the timing of the panel data collected allow unique control of biases in 
this impact analysis. We find that the multiplier among ejido sector recipients is in the 
range of 1.5 to 2.6. Multipliers are higher for medium and large farm households, low 
numbers of adults in the household, nonindigenous backgrounds, and households located 
in the Center and Gulf regions. High multipliers reflect marginal income opportunities 
that were unrealized due to liquidity constraints that the transfers eased. Opportunities 
came from the asset endowments that these households have, particularly irrigated land, 
and these opportunities were enhanced by access to technical assistance. 
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1. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EFFECTS OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS 
Social assistance programs are intended to induce behavioral responses among 
beneficiaries, and in most programs the degree of these responses are fundamental to how 
well the primary objectives of the programs are satisfied. Behavioral responses also 
create a wide range of indirect effects that need to be factored into the evaluation of the 
programs, as they may contribute significantly to the overall welfare impacts (Subbarao 
1997a). These indirect effects can be quite difficult to identify and measure, particularly 
when they are diffused over a wide range of undertakings and if they occur over long 
periods of time. Some of the indirect effects of the main types of social assistance 
programs currently used by governments and international development agencies include 
the following. 
 
1.  Food subsidy programs. The primary objective of these programs is to increase 
the nutritional status of beneficiaries. The increase in food intake is typically 
significantly less than the food received if transfers are inframarginal and, when 
supramarginal, if there are secondary markets for the food received. However, 
these programs are also designed with a perspective on the indirect effects that 
higher food consumption has on the health of household members, the schooling 
achievements of children, and the labor productivity of adults (Behrman 1996). 
There is an extensive literature on the measurement of such direct and indirect   2
effects (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988). There are, for instance, concerns about the 
potential negative indirect effects of these programs, such as the disincentive to 
work that they create for recipient households (see, for instance, Sahn and 
Alderman (1995) on the Sri Lanka food stamps program).  
2.  Employment generating programs. Public works programs have been used 
extensively as countercyclical interventions, e.g., to provide employment in the 
agricultural off-season or to compensate for negative income shocks such as 
drought or recession (Grosh 1994; Subbarao 1997b). The primary intended 
benefit is to provide recipients with a means of consumption smoothing. The 
indirect effects are usually of a public goods nature, and the distribution of the 
benefits depends on the type and quality of the asset created. For example, the 
construction of schools and clinics, irrigation infrastructure for small farmers, and 
roads all benefit different groups. In programs like food for work, where the work 
consists of introducing soil conservation practices on  land owned by the 
beneficiaries (e.g., Plan Sierra in the Dominican Republic; see de Janvry, 
Sadoulet, and Santos 1995), there is a private indirect effect through increased 
(future) income.  
3.  Credit programs. The primary objective of these programs is to increase income 
for  borrowers after loans have been repaid (Morduch 1998; Pitt and Khandker 
1998). Indirect effects of credit programs derive from factor reallocations induced 
by the relaxation of liquidity constraints such as improved children's education if 
they are relieved from farm work that competes with going to school. Other   3
indirect effects that are not easily measurable derive from increased business self-
confidence for participating women, the inducement of greater interactions and 
the creation of social capital among recipients, and the development of new 
activities on a collective basis by members of credit groups. Negative effects can 
include the removal of children from school if loans are used to acquire capital 
equipment with high risk of moral hazards when used by hired labor (see Wydick 
1999 for the response of weavers to credit programs in Guatemala).  
4.  Cash transfer programs. For these programs, the primary objective is simply to 
raise income through the cash received. There are, however, many derived effects 
from the transfers that are dependent on behavioral response. Several studies 
have, for instance, focused on the potential “negative” indirect effects of cash 
transfers on work effort, and on the decline in private transfers received by the 
targeted households if these transfers are crowded-out by public transfers (Cox 
and Jimenez 1992; Cox, Eser, and Jimenez 1998). To our knowledge, there are no 
studies of the positive indirect effects of cash transfer programs via income 
generation by putting the cash transferred to work. Yet, if the household is 
liquidity constrained and hence has underemployed and ill-allocated productive 
assets relative to an unconstrained situation, the cash transfer should generate 
benefits at least similar to a credit program—and expectedly higher, since there is 
no risk of failure to repay. The money transferred can be used to purchase current 
inputs or to invest in physical and human capital. Whether short-term income 
effects can be observed depends on the maturation time of the expenses. Expenses   4
on inputs for agricultural, commercial, or micro-manufacturing activities will 
have effects visible in the short run, as opposed to investments in equipment and 
especially in human capital that require longer maturation periods.  
 
In this paper, we analyze the direct and indirect income effects of cash transfers to 
Mexican farm households in the context of PROCAMPO (Program for Direct Assistance 
in Agriculture). This program was introduced to compensate for the anticipated negative 
price effects of trade liberalization on basic crops. We focus on the ejido sector, a large 
sector of generally impoverished households that received access to land through the 
extensive land reform program. These households are in the unusual position of being 
endowed with productive assets while at the same time severely starved for access to 
credit due to the incomplete nature of property rights in the ejido that prevents them from 
using the land as collateral to access credit. In this context, cash transfer programs can be 
expected to have particularly large multiplier effects on income. In addition, they can be 
expected to lead to visible labor reallocation effects toward the activities where the cash 
received is used if household labor was partially allocated as a strategy to overcome 
credit market failures.  
We calculate the magnitude of the income multipliers created by these transfers. 
We also identify under what conditions and for what types of households these 
multipliers were largest. This, in turn, provides guidelines for the management of transfer 
programs to rural poor households in order to maximize multiplier effects.   5
Assessing the impact of a program is usually plagued with the difficulty of 
controlling for biases arising from unobserved individual or regional characteristics that 
are correlated with program placement and program participation. In the case of 
PROCAMPO, systematic national coverage eliminates the standard program placement 
bias. Participation of eligible households is almost universal. However, eligibility itself 
and the amount that households receive are explicitly related to their cropping patterns. 
There is no doubt that unobserved household attributes affect both the cropping pattern, 
and hence the PROCAMPO transfers, and the outcome of interest, namely household 
income. Yet, we are able to exploit a truly exceptional situation where the basis for 
PROCAMPO transfers are the 1993 cropping patterns, while the program itself started 
only in the Fall of 1994, and households in the panel were surveyed in the Springs of 
1994 and 1997. As the 1994 survey took place prior to the PROCAMPO transfers, but 
after the rules were set, a household fixed-effects estimation circumvented the problem of 
household unobservables that could bias the estimated impact of the PROCAMPO 
program. Variability in the amount received by the different households then allowed an 
estimate of the marginal effect of one unit of transfer. 
 
2. THE PROCAMPO PROGRAM 
As a consequence of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), trade 
liberalization for basic crops competitive with U.S. and Canadian exports was anticipated 
to create a sharp decline in domestic prices for Mexican producers as prices for these   6
crops had been supported above border prices. The PROCAMPO program was 
introduced when NAFTA started (the Winter of 1994) as a compensatory income transfer 
targeted to these crop producers. The objectives were political (to manage the political 
acceptability of the free trade agreement among farmers), economic (to provide farmers 
with liquidity to adjust production to the new set of relative prices), and social (to prevent 
an increase in already extensive levels of poverty among smallholders and a rapid process 
of outmigration to the cities and the border in the North). The program was designed as a 
15-year transition toward free trade. 
Transfers are on a per-hectare basis, decoupled from current land use, and fixed 
across the whole country. Hectares that qualify were planted in any of nine basic crops 
(corn, beans, rice, wheat, sorghum, barley, soybeans, cotton, and cardamom) in one of the 
three agricultural years preceding August 1993. Since there are two agricultural cycles 
per year (Fall–Winter and Spring–Summer), payments are made twice a year for the area 
that had been planted in the corresponding cycle. Payments are hence quite different 
across households, but exogenous to current behavior. The only restriction is that land 
must currently be used in crops, livestock, or forestry, or be part of an approved 
environmental program (as opposed to being left idle), with freedom to choose among 
these options. Eligibility, both at inception as well as annually, is verified by local 
SAGAR (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Rural Development) officials, most 
often in conjunction with municipal or ejido authorities. 
PROCAMPO is a cash transfer program of significant magnitude. Since its 
inception in 1994, it has covered, on average, 14 million hectares a year, including more   7
than 95 percent of the area that had been planted in corn, beans, sorghum, and wheat. 
Payments are made to approximately 3 million producers a year, for a total expenditure in 
1998 of US$919 million (SAGAR 1998).
1 The compensatory payments are regressively 
distributed in the farm sector, as they are proportional to the area that had been planted in 
these crops. The 45 percent of producers with farms smaller that five hectares thus 
receive only 10 percent of the total PROCAMPO transfer (SAGAR 1998). However, 
transfers are progressively distributed on a per-hectare basis, since they are uniform per 
hectare, unrelated to the yields that were achieved and to whether households were 
selling basic crops before NAFTA, and hence were to be negatively affected by the 
expected decline in prices or not. Transfers thus reach producers who had never benefited 
from pre-NAFTA price support programs due to lack of marketed surplus (Martinez 
1999). In 1997, transfers represented, on average, US$329 per recipient and US$68 per 
hectare. This represents 46 percent of the gross maize income for a farmer who obtained 
the average yield of 1.06 tons per hectare and the average price of US$140 per ton 
observed in the ejido. These payments were to remain constant in real terms for the first 
10ten years, then phased out over the remaining five years of the program. However, the 
real value of payments was not fully maintained, as it was left to erode from US$102 to 
US$68 per hectare between 1994 and 1997. In spite of this, transfers still represent a very 
significant cash contribution to farm households, particularly the poor, with the potential 
                                                 
1 PROCAMPO is supported by a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank.   8
of not only adding importantly to their incomes but also affecting their behavior as farm 
producers, workers, and entrepreneurs in other income-generating activities.  
PROCAMPO is all the more important, given the severe scarcity of formal credit 
in the agricultural sector. Access to formal sources of credit dropped drastically from 
1994 to 1997. The percentage of ejidatario households that used formal credit fell from 
25 to 11 percent. Furthermore, the amount available for ejido agriculture from formal 
sources fell over this period. While in 1994 formal sources granted 134 pesos per hectare, 
by 1997 this had fallen to 40 pesos per hectare overall (in 1994 pesos). Overall, average 
loan size fell from 534 pesos per hectare in 1994 to 377 pesos per hectare in 1997. 
Current participation in PROCAMPO is limited to the households that were 
incorporated into the program when it was introduced in 1994. At that time, farmers had 
to show that they had planted at least one of the nine staple crops during the 1991–93 
agricultural cycles. Under PROCAMPO, eligible farmers must go at each agricultural 
cycle to one of more than 700 CADER (Centro de Ape al Desarrollo Rural) offices 
around the country and solicit their PROCAMPO payments. The maximum quantity of 
land for which they may receive transfers is equal to or less that the area they had 
registered in 1994. Payments are, in most cases, distributed as checks from CADER 
offices. PROCAMPO qualification certificates can also be used as collateral against 
which to borrow from commercial banks or input retailers, giving beneficiaries flexibility 
in the timing when cash is available against the cost of the interest charged. 
 
   9
3. THE EJIDO SECTOR AND THE DATA 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the PROCAMPO program on households 
in the ejido sector. The ejido sector was the product of the sweeping land reform that 
followed the peasant-led revolution of 1910. It contains approximately 60 percent of the 
Mexican rural population, half the country’s agricultural land, and half its irrigated land 
(Lamartine Yates 1981). In terms of social welfare, it is a major reservoir of rural poverty 
and an important source of migrants to the United States. This sector has been affected by 
important reforms since 1990 (DeWalt and Rees 1994). They include both global reforms 
affecting the context where ejidatario households operate (trade liberalization and 
NAFTA; generalized scaling down of subsidies), and reforms directly targeted at the 
sector (introduction of individual property rights over land plots formerly in usufruct; 
scaling down of official credit, marketing, and technical assistance services provided to 
the ejido by specialized state agencies; devolution of control over ejido affairs to the 
community; and greater freedoms for individual ejidatarios in making decisions about 
income strategies).  
The data we use are derived from a nationwide panel survey of ejido communities 
and ejidatario households within these communities. The data were collected in 1994 by 
the Mexican Ministry of Agrarian Reform and the University of California at Berkeley 
(see de Janvry, Gordillo, and Sadoulet 1997) and in 1997 by the Mexican Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform and the World Bank (see World Bank 1998). The data characterize   10
resource use and income formation by households. The sample with complete panel 
information on income includes 958 households.
2 
The vast majority of ejido households have access to PROCAMPO. As the data in 
Table 1 show, over 86 percent of the households in the survey had received PROCAMPO 
transfers in 1997. Transfers reach equally small and large landholders. More differences 
emerge when viewed by region. The lower shares of households receiving PROCAMPO 
in the North Pacific and in the South are due to historical cropping patterns outside the 
nine basic crops covered by the program.  
The direct value of PROCAMPO transfers represents, on average, almost 8 
percent of 1997 income for all households in the survey. While PROCAMPO transfers 
show some regressivity with respect to farm size, relative importance of transfers is 
reversed in the other asset endowments, representing a higher share of income for the 
indigenous population than for nonindigenous households, and for households with low 
levels of labor, education, and migration assets. Note that these values underestimate the 
total effect of PROCAMPO on incomes as they neglect the indirect effect of 
PROCAMPO transfers achieved through the income multipliers that we will analyze 
below. During the period under study, total household income increased by 14 percent. 
Hence, direct PROCAMPO transfers represent more than 60 percent of the registered 
increase in income. PROCAMPO transfers served as an important compensating 
                                                 
2 Data for 1994 and 1997 were constructed in a similar fashion, and include wage and other off-farm 
activities, agricultural and livestock activities, remittances, ejido income, rentals, and government programs 
such as PROCAMPO. Farm production not sold was valued at an average shadow price. Some adjustments 
were made in order to compensate for such problems as missing production cost data, for example.   11
mechanism for the larger landholders and for households with low labor, education, and 
migration assets for whom the observed change in income was less than the 
PROCAMPO transfer. Direct PROCAMPO transfers, however, fell short of 
compensating for the fall in income in the North-Pacific region, where agriculture is more 
technological and diversified.  
The data in Table 2 show the structure of household income by source for 1994 
and 1997. There are several remarkable facts to be noted. One is that even though all 
households are landed, the share of total income that derives from nonfarm activities is 
very high, and it rose from 47 percent to 55 percent during the period analyzed. This 
increase is in part due to the PROCAMPO program, which did not exist in 1994, and 
provided, on average in 1997, 7.7 percent of total household income and 14 percent of 
nonfarm income. In the period, income from agriculture declined due to adverse price 
incentives, and wage income stagnated as unemployment in Mexico rose with the 
aftermath of the peso crisis. By contrast, self-employment income rose and remittance 
income from the United States increased due to the double incentive of poor agriculture 
and labor market conditions in Mexico enhancing migration and a sharp depreciation of 
the real exchange rate with the U.S. dollar that drastically increased the purchasing power 
of dollar remittances.  
In what follows, we analyze the income multiplier effects of the PROCAMPO 
transfers by identifying the determinants of income change between 1994 and 1997. We 
measure the multiplier effect of PROCAMPO on total household income using several 
alternative econometric specifications. We then calculate this multiplier for specific   12
subsets of the population and for each income source. Finally, we track the origins of the 
PROCAMPO multiplier in agriculture by analyzing how PROCAMPO has induced 
greater use of purchased chemical inputs. 
 
4. ESTIMATING PROCAMPO INCOME MULTIPLIERS 
THE ECONOMETRIC PROCEDURE 
As for any program impact evaluation, it is crucial to properly control for biases 
that could come from endogenous participation in the PROCAMPO program. In this 
case, not only is PROCAMPO participation not random but, for a participant, the 
magnitude of the cash transfer is directly determined by the household’s historical 
behavior in its choice of cropping patterns.  
Consider the following income equation that relates income  y
t in year t = 1997 to 
the household’s asset endowment and characteristics z
t, the level of PROCAMPO transfer 
received P
t, the effect of unobservables f
t, and a random effect e
t: 
 
97 97 97 97 97 97
i i i i i P z y e f a b + + + =    
 
where b
97 is the vector of marginal return to the assets in 1997 and a the PROCAMPO 
income multiplier. Unobservables include both household characteristics such as 
managerial ability or land quality and external factors such as local conditions or 
government programs other than PROCAMPO. The standard problem in estimating the   13
PROCAMPO multiplier with such an equation is the potential bias on a created by a 
correlation between any unobservable and the PROCAMPO transfer P.  
In the impact assessment literature, the potential sources of correlation are 
classified under headings referred to as program placement and household selection (Pitt, 
Rosenzweig, and Gibbons 1993; Ravallion and Wodon 1998; Ravallion 1999). A 
program placement bias may occur if there is any systematic geographical bias in the way 
the PROCAMPO program reaches the population. The survey data confirm that this is 
not the case. All ejidos except 11 have been reached by PROCAMPO, and for eight of 
these, the reason for not receiving PROCAMPO transfers was noneligibility of the 
individual households. Hence only three ejidos, comprising 11 households (i.e., 1.2 
percent of the sample), may have been affected by lack of access due to unequal 
PROCAMPO reach.  
A household selection bias occurs if the individual participation to the program or 
the amount of transfer received is correlated to unobserved characteristics, be it through 
the explicit rules of the program itself or from self-selection of households that do not 
participate despite their eligibility. Reasons given by households for not participating 
were collected by enumerators: 45 percent say they do not qualify for PROCAMPO 
transfers, 10 percent that the transaction is too cumbersome to be worth the cost, and 22 
percent that they did not know about the program. One clearly cannot assume that lack of 
knowledge of the program or complaining about its functioning is not correlated with 
determinants of income. This self-selection is thus a potential source of bias. As for the   14
eligibility rule, PROCAMPO transfers are proportional to the area cultivated in nine basic 
crops in 1993. The cropping pattern in 1993 is a household decision taken jointly with all 
other decisions that determine the income of the household. It is therefore the function of 
the characteristics and the assets of the household in 1993 (z
93), and of the unobservables 
f
93. Hence, any correlation between unobservables in 1993 and 1997 would create a 
selection bias in the estimation of the PROCAMPO multiplier in a simple cross-section 
analysis.  
To eliminate this potential bias, we write the income equation in difference using 
the panel data for 1994 and 1997. Since there was no PROCAMPO program in 1994, 
differencing gives 
 
  ( ) ( )
94 97 94 97 97 94 94 97 97 94 97
i i i i i i i i i P z z y y e e f f a b b - + - + + - = - . 
 
The difference in unobservables ( )
94 97
i i f f -  only captures unobserved events that 
have occurred during the period 1994–1997, while the PROCAMPO transfers are 
determined on the basis of the information available in 1993. Can there be any correlation 
between the difference in unobservables and P?  
The timing of the decision ensures that PROCAMPO transfers cannot be 
influenced by these unobserved events. Yet the opposite may happen: as PROCAMPO 
transfers have been extended since 1994, some changes in household assets may result 
from past PROCAMPO transfers. For the analysis to be valid, all productive assets that 
could have been accumulated with PROCAMPO transfers between 1994 and 1997 must   15
consequently be observed and not remain among the unobserved f factor. One important 
asset that is particularly sensitive to windfall income is livestock. It is therefore essential 
that livestock assets at the beginning of the survey years be included in the set of asset 
variables z. Incomplete information on livestock raises some problems in that respect. We 
will return to this point after we present the basic estimation results. 
To summarize, we estimate the equation, 
 
  ,
97 94 94 97 97 94 97
i i i i i i P z z y y h a b b + + - = -  




97. Note that as the environment—and notably prices—has changed between 
the years of the two surveys, we do not assume constant returns to assets and let the 
coefficients vary with the year. For the household characteristics that are invariant over 
time, only the difference between the two parameters b
97 and b
94 is estimated. For the 
characteristics that changed over the period, the estimation of two separate parameters 
allows us to distinguish the effect due to the change in the return to any asset z as 
captured by the difference between the parameters and the effect due to the change in 
asset position (Oaxaca 1994; Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Lustig 1999).  
 
THE OVERALL PROCAMPO MULTIPLIER 
The set of z variables includes land (irrigated and rainfed land, pasture, and the 
household share of common property land), livestock, human capital assets (gender and 
age of household head, number and average education of adults), and social assets   16
(Mexico and U.S. migration assets, ethnicity, and access to technical assistance and to 
formal credit).  
A household’s migration assets characterize both the historical migration and the 
current permanent migration of household members. The construction of this variable is 
based on information common to the two surveys.
3 Historical migration is measured by 
the number of household members who had migrated earlier but had returned home at 
least two years prior to the survey. The current permanent migration is measured by the 
number of children of the household head who are permanently established away from 
home. Note that no household members currently in temporary migration are included in 
these assets. This is because current temporary migration is a household decision jointly 
taken with all the other choices that contribute to the formation of income. 
Among ejidatarios, access to technical assistance and to formal credit are 
essentially supply-determined and hence are considered exogenous to household 
decision-making. In addition to these assets, regional effects are added to control for 
geographical characteristics such as land quality, weather, and local level of economic 
development.  
An important issue with agricultural household income is its extreme volatility, 
due to large fluctuations in weather conditions. This creates several econometric 
problems. The first is the presence of a large number of observations that are clear 
                                                 
3 A more complete specification of migration assets, including both family and social networks, was used 
and shown to be important in the decision of a household to send migrants and hence in receiving 
remittances (Winters, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 1999). However, lack of comparable data on the extended 
family in 1994 and 1997 forced us to reduce the variable to the family members in this analysis.   17
outliers. The second is the fact that, since these fluctuations are weather related, they are 
likely to be correlated across observations from the same geographical area. The third is a 
more standard problem of heteroscedasticity as the volatility of income is directly related 
to the agricultural income itself and hence likely to land assets. To address these potential 
problems, we estimate the income equation model with Robust Regression and Least 
Absolute Deviations (LAD) (or median) estimators. The Robust Regression screens out 
or discounts outliers by weighting observations. It is an iterative process in which the 
calculation of weights is based on the absolute residuals of the previous iteration. The 
LAD estimator does not assume any specific distribution of the residuals h and gives 
consistent estimates even in the presence of heteroscedasticity and nonindependent 
residuals. LAD estimators are also less sensitive to outliers than OLS, because they 
minimize the deviations around the median rather than the square of the deviations 
around the mean. While LAD estimators seem to perform well in large samples, the 
standard deviations of the parameters are, however, usually large for small samples, 
which is our case. Hence, results from the two estimation techniques have distinct 
advantages and inconveniences, and should be looked at as mutually reinforcing. 
The results from the Robust Regression estimation, reported in Table 3, show that 
household income is importantly determined by irrigated and rainfed land assets, number 
of adults, and access to technical assistance, and in 1997 by US migration assets and 
adult education. Note that, as conditions for agricultural production deteriorated in 1997, 
land assets have lost importance in income determination compared to 1994. In contrast,   18
human capital assets and migration assets, which are both sources of off-farm income, 
have gained in importance. Geographically, the region that benefited most during the 
period is the Gulf and the region that did worse is the North Pacific. 
Access to cash transfers through PROCAMPO creates positive externalities on 
income change, with a 1 peso transfer inducing a direct increase of 1.97 pesos as 
estimated with Robust Regression. The corresponding 95 percent confidence interval 
reported in Table 4 is [1.5–2.6]. Hence, the marginal income effect of a 1 peso income 
transfer through PROCAMPO on beneficiary households is high. This is associated with 
PROCAMPO helping relax the liquidity constraint on farm households.  
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
A particular issue arises with the measure of the livestock asset. Livestock is both 
a productive asset and a flexible savings instrument. Therefore, the herd size that 
generates the livestock income in 1997 may itself have been partly acquired with the 
current year PROCAMPO transfer. Hence the estimation of the equation, 
  ,
97 94 94 97 97 94 94 97 97 94 97
i i i i i i i i P l zl l zl z z y y h a b b b b + + - + - = -  
 
where zl and bl refer to the livestock asset, would tend to underestimate the impact of 
PROCAMPO. An alternative specification is to use the herd size in the previous year. 
However, since the 1993 stock was not observed, using instead the 1994 stock introduces 
a bias, as follows: 
  ( ) .
97 94 93 94 94 94 97 96 94 94 97 97 94 97
i i i i i i i i i i P l zl zl l zl l zl z z y y h a b b b b b + + - + - + - = -    19
Is the missing term  ( )
93 94
i i zl zl - , i.e., growth of the livestock herd in 1993, 
correlated with the PROCAMPO transfer? Descriptive statistics indicate positive but low 
correlation between PROCAMPO transfers and herd size or growth in herd size. An 
estimation of the equation above would thus tend to give an overestimation of the impact 
of PROCAMPO. Estimations of both equations, giving potential under- and 
overestimation of the parameter, respectively, are reported in Table 4. They show very 
similar values for the PROCAMPO parameters, indicating that no bias is introduced 
when using the 1997 and 1994 livestock herd sizes. 
To check on the robustness of the estimation of PROCAMPO multipliers, we use 
several alternative econometric specifications. Table 4 compares estimates for the 
PROCAMPO multiplier under robust regression, median regression, and ordinary least 
squares (OLS). In each case, we report the 95 percent confidence interval and the test of 
whether the parameter is significantly greater than one at 99 percent, i.e., that there is a 
significant multiplier effect. We see that while the OLS and the LAD point estimators are 
higher than the robust regression multiplier, they have larger standard deviations. Overall, 
however, it is the remarkable similarity of these values across econometric estimators that 
gives confidence in the robustness of the large multiplier effects observed for the 
PROCAMPO transfers.  
   20
WHICH HOUSEHOLDS ARE MORE EFFECTIVE IN GENERATING INCOME 
FROM PROCAMPO TRANSFERS? 
We can identify who in the heterogeneous ejido population was able to derive 
greater advantage from the PROCAMPO transfers by comparing the income multiplier 
across population subsets. Results are presented in Table 5. One expects that the 
multiplier should be greater when a household has more assets and when they are more 
underused due to greater liquidity constraint. This suggests that neither the households 
with very low asset endowments, nor the best endowed households who may face less 
severe liquidity constraints, would benefit as much as a group intermediate between the 
two. This is exactly what the multiplier by farm size indicates (classes are defined on land 
use in 1994, as land use in 1997 is endogenous): the multiplier is 0.24 on smaller farms, 
2.77 on medium farms, and 2.04 on the larger farms. In terms of human capital assets, the 
multiplier is higher for households with a smaller labor force (2.75 versus 0.93), since the 
liquidity constraint is more binding on them as they could engage less in compensatory 
activities that serve as sources of liquidity. The multiplier is also higher for households 
with higher levels of education (1.60 versus 1.25), although the difference in parameters 
is not statistically significant. The PROCAMPO effect is independent of the presence of 
migration assets, indicating that households with remittances are not subject to liquidity 
constraints. Finally, the PROCAMPO income multiplier is lower for indigenous 
households (0.19 versus 2.27 for nonindigenous), and for households living in the North 
and North-Pacific (in both cases not significantly different from 0). These multipliers 
reveal the shadow income value of liquidity for the corresponding category of recipient   21
households, reflecting in each case the particular marginal cost of uncaptured 
opportunities due to constraining liquidity. Results thus reveal that the greatest absolute 
income payoff (pesos of income per pesos of transfer) from relaxing liquidity constraints 
is among medium and large farmers, families with a small number of adults, 
nonindigenous households, and, regionally, the Gulf and the Center. 
 
5. PROCAMPO TRANSFERS AND THE INTENSIFICATION OF 
AGRICULTURE 
The above results on PROCAMPO multipliers by farm size show that transfers 
can be productively used in agriculture. This is clearly confirmed by farmers’ responses 
to questions about use of their PROCAMPO receipts. In the survey, 70 percent of the 
households responded that they use the PROCAMPO money to purchase inputs. In a 
larger survey done by the Ministry of Agriculture (SAGAR 1998), 44 percent of 
respondents said that PROCAMPO transfers allowed them to increase their input 
purchases and another 17 percent to start using purchased inputs. This happened despite 
the fact that PROCAMPO transfers have often arrived late in the season (93 percent say 
they arrive after the promised date). While farmers would clearly benefit more from 
receiving PROCAMPO at the time they purchase their inputs, many of them purchase 
inputs either by collateralizing their PROCAMPO rights, or directly by obtaining credit 
from suppliers on the basis of the forthcoming transfers. Respondents say, however, that 
transfers are not sufficient to induce changes in cropping patterns or in the extent of areas   22
planted. To confirm this, we analyze the changes in agricultural income and in input use 
induced by PROCAMPO transfers using the 1994 and 1997 panel data. Results are 
presented in Table 6.  
Although explaining the very volatile agricultural income is difficult, results 
indicate a positive multiplier effect in agriculture, with every peso of PROCAMPO 
transfer generating, at mean value, 0.33 pesos in agricultural income. As can be seen 
from the interaction terms with land, this effect is obtained through ownership of irrigated 
land. It is also largely influenced by the availability of complementary technical 
assistance. Setting technical assistance to zero would reduce the income multiplier from 
0.33 to 0.23. The interactive term with credit confirms the role of PROCAMPO as a 
substitute for credit. Setting access to credit to zero (rather than at the mean value of 
0.18) would increase the multiplier from 0.33 to 0.51. Hence, it is those households that 
control more irrigated land, have access to technical assistance, and no access to credit 
that are able to take greater advantage of the cash transferred in generating more income. 
Use of chemicals as estimated by a random effect probit equation also shows a significant 
positive response to PROCAMPO transfers. We do not have information on the amount 
used in 1994 and hence cannot measure the effect reported in interviews of increased 
applications for those who already used some chemicals in 1994. 
Livestock income also responds to PROCAMPO transfers, with every peso of 
transfer generating 0.28 pesos of livestock income. Note that this estimation does not 
include the use of PROCAMPO transfers to purchase livestock. It therefore likely 
underestimates the long-term effect of PROCAMPO on livestock income.   23
As in all cash transfer programs (Subbarao 1997a), it is important to assess the 
impact transfers have on labor market participation. The labor market income effect due 
to PROCAMPO can derive both from a change in labor market participation and/or from 
a direct effect of PROCAMPO once participation has been decided. For farm households 
that participate in the labor market with the objective of relaxing liquidity constraints or 
of achieving portfolio diversification in their sources of income, cash transfers can lead to 
a reallocation of labor from the labor market to the farm. The partial results presented in 
Table 7 show that the PROCAMPO effect is indeed negative on labor market 
participation. On average, PROCAMPO transfers reduce labor market participation by 9 
percent (from 45.4 to 41.8 percent). No significant effect is observed on participation to 
self-employment activities. Hence, this suggests that some households withdrew from the 
labor market in order to spend more time in agriculture once they gained access to the 
necessary liquidity. This result supports the notion that there was excess participation in 
the labor market by households endowed in land and other productive resources in 
response to credit market failures. PROCAMPO thus served indirectly as a mechanism to 
alleviate the stringency of this constraint, allowing households to reallocate part of their 
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6. THE TRUE CONTRIBUTION OF PROCAMPO TO INCOME 
MAINTENANCE 
As indicated in Section 3 of this paper, the true contribution of the PROCAMPO 
cash transfers to income maintenance is the sum of the monetary value of the transfers 
(direct effects) and the income generated through indirect effects measured by multipliers 
in excess of one. We can use the estimated multipliers in Table 5 to predict what would 
have been the change in income during the 1994–1997 period had there been no 
PROCAMPO program. This is done in Table 8. For all households, the observed income 
change is 14.2 percent. The direct cash transfer represents an increase of 8.7 percent over 
1994 income. With a multiplier of 2.06, the indirect effect is a contribution to income of 
9.3  percent over 1994 income. Hence, the total PROCAMPO contribution is an increase 
in income of 18 percent over the 1994 level. Had there been no PROCAMPO program, 
household income would, on average, have declined by 3.9 percent. Contrasting this 
result with the data in Table 1 shows the importance of accounting for the indirect 
income effects of cash transfers in assessing the impact of such programs. In Table 1, it 
appeared that PROCAMPO transfers would not have been necessary for income 
maintenance since other sources of income would have sustained an income increase of 
5.4 percent. In fact, these other incomes were themselves related to the hidden multiplier 
effects of PROCAMPO transfers. 
If they had not put the cash transfers to work, many categories of households 
would have suffered income declines in spite of the appearance of rising income after   25
discounting the direct transfers. This applies to medium farmers, nonindigenous 
households, and households in the Center region. There are five instances where transfers 
were not used to generate more income: smallholders, households with a large number of 
adults, indigenous households, and households in the North and North-Pacific, all of 
which were found to have income multipliers of less than one. In spite of this, however, 
all households were made better off by the cash transfers compared to the income levels 




The indirect effects of cash transfer programs have received little attention. Yet, 
we found that these effects can be highly significant and that they deserve full 
consideration in the design of such programs. We show, in particular, that PROCAMPO, 
a cash transfer program to Mexican farmers introduced in compensation for the 
anticipated decline in the price of staple crops as a consequence of trade liberalization, 
created large indirect effects among ejidatarios through multiplication of the liquidity 
received. The multiplier for all households is in the range of 1.5 to 2.6. Multipliers are 
higher for households with medium and large farms, low numbers of adults in the 
household, nonindigenous backgrounds, and located in the Center and Gulf regions. 
Large multipliers reflect uncaptured marginal income opportunities due to liquidity 
constraints that are relaxed by the transfers. Opportunities come from the asset 
                                                 
4 The only negative multiplier, for households in the North-Pacific, is not significantly different from 0.   26
endowments that these households have, particularly irrigated land, and they are 
enhanced by access to technical assistance. Liquidity constraints derive from incomplete 
property rights in the ejido sector, and from the current disarray of financial institutions 
servicing agriculture following scaling down of the agricultural development bank 
implied by structural adjustment. Large multipliers thus reflect sizable gaps between 
opportunities and constraints. Households with migrants sending remittances and with 
higher levels of education may thus have lower multipliers because they were able to 
work around the liquidity constraints more effectively than other households. Households 
with little land and with ethnic backgrounds may have lower access to liquidity, but also 
have lower opportunities to invest additional cash received, again resulting in lower 
multipliers. 
There are two policy implications that derive from this analysis. First is that if 
multiplier effects are important and policy-responsive (as suggested by heterogeneity of 
multipliers across households), then the PROCAMPO program would gain from being 
managed as part of a comprehensive effort to maximize these multipliers (since the 
ultimate goal is to raise the income of targeted households). This can be done by 
introducing complementary rural development initiatives that increase opportunities to 
use the transfers productively. It is worth emphasizing that the households that benefit 
from the multiplier effect are primarily from higher income groups. Thus, while 
increasing incomes, the indirect effect does not reinforce the impact of the direct effect 
on poverty. Thus the cash transfer that maximizes the multiplier effect may not be the 
most effective at reducing poverty.   27
We observed that additional liquidity serves principally to increase the use of 
current inputs. Transfers thus enhance the level of traditional activities. We found no 
evidence of technological change or of the introduction of new activities (see SAGAR 
1998 for a similar observation). In correspondence with the new set of incentives 
introduced by NAFTA, transfers should instead be used for the modernization of 
agriculture and its diversification toward high value activities with comparative 
advantage. That this is not happening is not surprising. In the current context of declining 
institutional support to agriculture, only 18 percent of the ejidatarios have access to 
formal credit, 13 percent to Alianza para el Campo, the main public program in support 
of rural development, and 7 percent to technical assistance. Multiplier effects could thus 
be significantly increased if the PROCAMPO program were accompanied by a serious 
effort at institutional reconstruction and technological change in support of the 
modernization and diversification of ejido agriculture. 
The second policy implication is that high multipliers show capacity to borrow 
even at high interest rates. Willingness to pay for liquidity is somewhat overrepresented 
by the magnitude of the multipliers, since they need to be discounted for the risk of 
borrowing, which is not present with gifted money. However, the results show that there 
is a clear unmet need for liquidity that can be productively invested, and that ejidatarios 
can pay for this service at interest rates that are quite compatible with current commercial 
rates. This shows the high payoff that exists from constructing an alternative set of 
financial institutions able to replace the parastatals that previously served the sector. If 
land is to serve as collateral in accessing loans in these financial institutions, then the   28
current titling program should have a high payoff. Titling without access to credit will, 
however, not change the current situation. PROCAMPO multipliers help reveal the 
shadow value of liquidity in every category of potential borrowers. They consequently 
provide a metric to identify where the effective demand for financial services is the 
greatest. 
The magnitude of the PROCAMPO multipliers should be taken as proof that the 
ejido sector is not to be discounted as a lively sector for investment and growth. To avoid 
this potential being wasted, transfers should be complemented with investment 
opportunities in new commodities and new technologies, and the institutions that service 
the sector, most particularly for accessing liquidity, should be reconstructed.   29
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Table 1—PROCAMPO in household income, ejido households, 1997 
    PROCAMPO 
Observed 
total 
Sources of income 
change  
Categories of households 
Number of 
observations Participation* 





1994-97  PROCAMPO 
Other 
incomes 
    (%)   (%)   (%)  (% of 1994 income) 
             
All households  956  86.4  7.7  14.2  8.7  5.4 
Farm size: land used in 1994             
 Small (< 3 hectares)  322  84.8  6.3  20.9  7.6  13.3 
 Medium (3 to 7 hectares)  282  90.1*  8.3  29.7  10.7  19.0 
 Large (> 7 hectares)  352  84.9  7.9  4.8  8.3  -3.5 
Labor asset: number of adults in the household         
 Low (< 4 adults)  514  85.4  8.4  2.2  8.6  -6.4 
 High ( ‡ 4 adults)  442  87.6  7.0  27.3  8.9  18.4 
Education asset: average adult education           
 Low (< 4.5 years)  480  87.3  9.7  9.8  10.7  -0.9 
 High ( ‡ 4.5 years)  476  85.5  6.5  16.8  7.6  9.1 
Migration assets for the United States           
 No migration asset  526  84.8  8.0  6.2  8.5  -2.3 
 Positive migration asset  430  88.4*  7.4  20.8  9.0  11.8 
Social assets: ethnicity             
 Indigenous  209  84.7  8.9  30.4  11.6  18.8 
 Nonindigenous  747  86.9  7.5  12.1  8.4  3.7 
Regions:             
 North  207  90.3  9.0  42.6  12.8  29.9 
 North Pacific  103  74.8*  5.3  -40.2  3.2  -43.4 
 Center  262  89.7  8.7  19.7  10.4  9.2 
 Gulf  166  90.4  9.5  94.4  18.4  76.0 
 South  218  81.2*  4.5  15.0  5.2  9.8 
Notes: * Indicates significantly different at 95 percent. For farm size, comparison is made with the small farms. For the 
regions, comparison is made with the North.   31
Table 2—Sources of income, ejido households, 1994 and 1997 
All households  1994  1997 
Percent change in 
income 
Test of difference in 
income 
             
Total household income (1994 pesos)  10,828  12,361  14.2  * 
      (shares, in percentage)     
Farm income  53.1  45.1  -3.0   
 Agriculture  38.3  27.7  -17.5   
 Livestock  14.8  17.4  34.5  ** 
             
Farm income  46.9  54.9  33.6  ** 
 Off-farm activities  36.4  40.2  26.3  ** 
   Wage income  27.6  24.2  0.0   
   Self-employment  6.7  9.8  67.2  ** 
   Remittances  2.1  6.3  242.8  ** 
 Other off-farm income  10.6  7.0  -23.9  ** 
 PROCAMPO  0.0  7.7     
             
Number of observations  956  956     
Note: * (**) means significantly different at 95 percent (99 percent). 
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Table 3—Change in total household income between 1994 and 1997 
      Robust regression 
    Mean value  Coefficient  Standard deviation  P-value 
           
Asset or characteristic in 1994: parameter isb
94       
  Irrigated area owned (hectares)    0.9  609  175  0.00 
  Rainfed area owned (hectares)    6.5  140  43  0.00 
  Pasture area owned (hectares)    3.5  5  31  0.88 
  Common property land per ejidatario (hectares)   24.8  2  10  0.83 
  Cattle (number of heads)    6.4  265  32  0.00 
           
  Number of adults    3.4  500  202  0.01 
  Average years of education among adults    4.5  254  176  0.15 
  Mexico migration assets    0.14  -1,011  835  0.23 
  U.S. migration assets    0.42  451  378  0.23 
           
  Access to technical assistance (dummy)    0.10  1,822  1,046  0.08 
  Access to formal credit (dummy)    0.31  938  662  0.16 
           
Asset or characteristic in 1997: parameter is b
97        
  Irrigated area owned (hectares)    1.24  230*  111  0.04 
  Rainfed area owned (hectares)    7.8  30*  34  0.39 
  Pasture area owned (hectares)    4.2  -14  23  0.55 
  Common property land per ejidatario (hectares)   25.3  8  9  0.38 
  Cattle (number of heads)    7.4  236  28  0.00 
           
  Number of adults    3.64  639  196  0.00 
  Average years of education among adults    4.55  547*  184  0.00 
  Mexico migration assets    0.21  -950  695  0.17 
  U.S. migration assets    0.74  791  271  0.00 
           
  Access to technical assistance (dummy)    0.07  2,918  1,199  0.02 
  Access to formal credit (dummy)    0.18  -140  849  0.87 
           
PROCAMPO transfer         
  PROCAMPO transfer (pesos)    947  2.1  0.3  0.00 
           
Constant asset or characteristic: parameter is b
97 - b
94       
  Gender of household head (man = 1)    0.97  474  1,764  0.79 
  Age of household head    51.8  30  24  0.22 
  Indigenous (dummy)    0.22  -807  805  0.32 
           
Regional effects (base = North)         
  North Pacific    0.11  -4,555  1,236  0.00 
  Center    0.27  -1,450  879  0.10 
  Gulf    0.17  1,235  1,124  0.27 
  South    0.23  -414  974  0.67 
           
Intercept    -2,539  2,512  0.31 
Goodness-of-fit         
  Number of observations    956     
  F(30, 925)    10.10     
1 Standard errors estimated with bootstrapping. 
* Significantly different from the 1994 parameter at 95 percent.   33
Table 4—PROCAMPO multipliers 
Number of observations: 956 
  With cattle stock in 1997    With cattle stock in 1996 
   95% conf.      95% conf. 
  Coefficient  interval    Coefficient  interval 
           
Robust regression  2.06**  1.5-2.6    2.09**  1.5-2.7 
Quintile regression: median (LAD)
a  2.20**  1.3-3.1    2.17  1.1-3.2 
OLS  2.24  0-4.5    2.30  0-4.6 
Note: ** Significantly different from 1 at 99 percent. 
a Standard errors estimated with bootstrapping. 
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Table 5—PROCAMPO multipliers for selected groups of recipients 
    Robust regression 
    Coefficient  t-statistic 
       
All households  2.06  7.1 
Farm size: land used in 1994     
  Small (< 3 hectares)  0.24  0.4 
  Medium (3 to 7 hectares)  2.77  3.6 
  (P-value for test of difference)  (0.01)   
       
  Large (> 7 hectares)  2.04  4.3 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.42)   
      
Number of adults in the household     
 Low (<4 adults)  2.75  9.2 
 High (‡ 4 adults)  0.93  2.0 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.02)   
      
Average adult education     
 Low (<4.5 years)  1.25  3.6 
 High (‡ 4.5 years)  1.6  3.3 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.56)   
       
U.S. migration assets     
 Zero migration assets  2.05  6.7 
 Positive migration assets  1.9  3.6 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.79)   
      
Social assets: ethnicity     
 Indigenous household   0.19  0.5 
 Nonindigenous household  2.27  6.6 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.00)   
      
Regional effects     
  North-Pacific  -2.1  0.3 
  North  0.15  0.8 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.28)   
 Gulf  2.21  5.5 
 (P-value for test of difference)  (0.01)   
 Center  2.81  4.7 
  (P-value for test of difference)  (0.41)   
  South  1.09  0.8 
  (P-value for test of difference)  (0.25)     35
Table 6—Effect of PROCAMPO on agricultural activities, partial results 
Partial results: coefficients on assets not reported. 
Agricultural income  (Robust regression on difference) 
 PROCAMPO transfer  0.19 
 P-value  0.31 
     
 PROCAMPO *irrigated area  0.23 
 P-value  0.00 
     
 PROCAMPO *rainfed area  -0.01 
 P-value  0.10 
     
 PROCAMPO *technical assistance  1.44 
 P-value  0.00 
     
 PROCAMPO *access to credit  -0.99 
 P-value  0.00 
     
 PROCAMPO at mean value of exogenous variables  0.33 
 P-value  0.02 
     
 PROCAMPO at mean value, but no credit  0.51 
 P-value  0.00 
     
 PROCAMPO at mean value, but no technical assistance  0.23 
 P-value  0.10 
     
Use of chemicals  (Probit random effect) 
 PROCAMPO transfer  0.00016 
 P-value  0.02 
     
 Average value without PROCAMPO
a  48.6% 
 Average value with PROCAMPO
a  52.5% 
     
Livestock income  (Tobit random effect) 
 PROCAMPO transfer  0.28 
 P-value  0.07 
     
a Average expected probability calculated by sample enumeration.   36
Table 7—Effect of PROCAMPO on labor market participation and self-
employment 
Partial results: coefficients on assets not reported 
    Random effect  Random effect 
    Probit on  Tobit on 
    participation  income 
       
Wage labor market     
 PROCAMPO transfer  -0.000120  -0.33 
 P-value  0.02  0.56 
       
 Average value without PROCAMPO
a  45.4%   
 Average value with PROCAMPO
a  41.8%   
       
Nonfarm self-employment activities     
 PROCAMPO transfer  -0.000048  -0.67 
 P-value  0.35  0.24 
       
 Average value without PROCAMPO
a  26.5%   
 Average value with PROCAMPO
a  25.2%   
       
a Average expected probability calculated by sample enumeration. 
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Table 8—Contribution of PROCAMPO in income changes, 1994-1997 
   Observed total     Income change due to PROCAMPO    Income change 
Categories of households 
Income 
change1994-97    Direct  Indirect  Total
a   
without 
PROCAMPO 
   (percent)    (percent of 1994 income)     
                
All households  14.2    8.7  9.3  18.0    -3.9 
Land asset               
 Small (< 3 hectares)  20.9    7.6  -5.8  1.8    19.1 
 Medium (3 to 7 hectares)  29.7    10.7  19.0  29.7    0.0 
 Large (‡ 7 hectares)  4.8    8.3  8.6  16.9    -12.1 
Labor asset               
 Low (<4 adults)  2.2    8.6  15.1      -21.5 
 High (‡ 4 adults)  27.3    8.9  -0.6      19.0 
Education asset               
 Low (<4.5 years)  9.8    10.7  2.7      -3.6 
 High (‡ 4.5 years)  16.8    7.6  4.6      4.6 
Migration assets for U.S.               
 No migration asset  6.2    8.5  8.9  17.4    -11.2 
 With migration asset  20.8    9.0  8.1  17.0    3.8 
Social assets               
 Indigenous  30.4    11.6  23.7  2.2    28.2 
 Nonindigenous  12.1    8.4  8.3  19.1    -6.9 
Region               
 North  42.6    12.8  13.3  1.9    40.7 
 North Pacific  -40.2    3.2  12.2  -6.7    -33.5 
 Center  19.7    10.4    23.0    -3.4 
 Gulf  94.4    18.4  33.3  51.6    42.8 
 South  15.0    5.2  0.5  5.7    9.3 
a Total effect computed with the multipliers reported in Table 5.        
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